Žižek - povstávání subjektu

v:

http://www.control-z.com/storage/Zizek-The%20Parallax%20View.pdf

” I am thus tempted to revert the standard Manfred Frank gesture of concluding (from the failure of reflection, of the self-reflective grounding of the subject’s identity in the recognition of “himself” in his other) that there must be a previous direct self-acquaintance: what if failure comes first, what if the “subject” is nothing but the void, the gap, opened up by the failure of reflection? What if all the figures of positive self-acquaintance are just so many secondary “fillers” of this primordial gap? Every recognition of the subject in an image or a signifying trait (in short: every identification) already betrays its core; every jubilant “That’s me!” already contains the seed of “That’s not me!”

- XX neúplnost subjektu: primární "To nejsem já" je sekundárně vyplňováno různými identifikacemi, obrázky, znaky: "Toto jsem já"

- XX subjekt je původně prázdno, mezera otevřená selháním a chybami reflexivity, sebe-reflexe


However, what if, far from consisting in some substantial kernel of identity, inaccessible to reflective recuperation, the subject (as distinct from substance) emerges in this very moment of the failure of identification?

- XX subjekt v každém okamžiku povstává jako chybná sebe-identifikace, jako její selhání

subjekt jako prázdno, pohyb, kdy v momentu nerozpoznání (je samou mezerou) vzniká nesubstanční subjekt, prázdno, méně než nic

That is to say: (self-)consciousness is not the pattern which “spontaneously” emerges from the interaction of multiple agents but, rather, its exact obverse, or a kind of negative: it is, in its primordial dimension, the experience of some malfunctioning, of some perturbation, in this spontaneous pattern or organization.

- XX subjekt je pasivní zkušeností chyby, špatné funkce spontánní sebe-organizace z interakce více domén/agentů


(Self-)consciousness (the “thick moment” of consciousness, the awareness that I am now-here-alive)66 is originally passive: in clear contrast to the notion according to which self-awareness originates in the subject’s active relationship toward its environs, and is the constitutive moment of our activity of realizing a determinate goal, what I am originally “aware of” is that I am not in control, that my design has mis- fired, that things are just drifting by. For that very reason a computer which merely executes its program in a top-down way, “does not think,” is not conscious of itself.

- XX původní vědomí "Já jsem nyní a zde živý" je pasivní: nemám se pod kontrolou, můj plán/design selhal, věci se jen samy nějak posunuly


 I am therefore tempted to apply here the dialectical reversal of epistemological obstacle into positive ontological condition: what if the “enigma of consciousness,” its inexplicable character, contains its own solution? What if all we have to do is to transpose the gap which makes consciousness (as the object of our study) “inexplicable” into consciousness itself?

- XX epistemologická překážka, tedy nevysvětlitelnost, neexplikovatelnost vědomí je jeho ontologickým stavem, podstatou, podmínkou, základem, určením!!!


jáství je pasivní zkušenost, překážka, ne-sebe-vědomí, spontánně vše selhává

a to nás vede do psychotické hegelovské "Noci světa":

This brings us back to the notion of the “Night of the World”: in this momentary suspension of the positive order of reality, we confront the ontological gap on account of which “reality” is never a complete, self-enclosed, positive order of being. It is only this experience of psychotic withdrawal from reality, of absolute self-contraction, which accounts for the mysterious “fact” of transcendental freedom: for a (self-)consciousness which is in effect “spontaneous,” whose spontaneity is not an effect of misrecognition of some “objective” process.


- subjekt se ustaví sebereferenčním performativním aktem:

the subject is that X which is added to the designated content by means of the act of its self-referential designation.

- XX subjekt je toto X, které je přidáno (vytvoří se) označením psychofyzického obsahu skrze akt jeho sebe-referenčního označení

The point here is that we should take Lacan’s term “subject of the signifier” literally: there is, of course, no substantial signified content which guarantees the unity of the I; at this level, the subject is multiple, dispersed, and so forth—its unity is guarthe loop of freedom anteed only by the self-referential symbolic act, that is,“I” is a purely performative entity, it is the one who says “I.”This is the mystery of the subject’s “self-positing,” explored by Fichte: of course, when I say “I,” I do not create any new content, I merely designate myself, the person who is uttering the phrase.This self-designation nonetheless gives rise to (“posits”) an X which is not the “real” flesh-and-blood person uttering it, but, precisely and merely, the pure Void of self-referential designation (the Lacanian “subject of the enunciation”):“I” am not directly my body, or even the content of my mind; “I” am, rather, that X which has all these features as its properties. The Lacanian subject is thus the “subject of the signifier”—not in the sense of being reducible to one of the signifiers in the signifying chain (“I” is not directly the signi- fier I, since, in this case, a computer or another machine writing “I” would be a subject), but in a much more precise sense: when I say “I”—when I designate “myself” as “I”—this very act of signifying adds something to the “real flesh-and-blood entity” (inclusive of the content of its mental states, desires, attitudes) thus designated, and the subject is that X which is added to the designated content by means of the act of its self-referential designation. It is therefore misleading to say that the unity of the I is “a mere fiction” beneath which there is the multitude of inconsistent mental processes: the point is that this fiction gives rise to “effects in the Real,” that is to say, it acts as a necessary presupposition to a series of “real” acts.

- XX já je čistě performativní entita vznikající symbolickým aktem, pojmenováním, říkáním "Já"

- XX jednota jáství však není čistá fikce: aktem pojmenování vzniká do jisté míry reálná jednota
- XX symbol "Já" není jen symbol vedle jiných symbolů, v řetězci symbolů (protože to by pak počítač či jiný stroj píšící "já" byl také subjektem), ale sjednocuje skrze sebe-referenční označení do jisté míry psychofyzický organismus

vše přijímám jako vlastní volbu:

To recapitulate: Kantian Self-Consciousness is a purely logical function which implies only that every content of my consciousness is already minimally mediated/ reflected: when I desire X, I can never say “I’m just like that, I can’t help desiring X, it’s part of my nature,” since I always desire to desire X, that is, I reflectively accept my desire for X—all reasons which motivate me to act exert their causal power only insofar as I “posit” or accept them as reasons.


nevědomí jako základ vědomí:

Here again we encounter the subject as the Void of pure reflectivity, as that X to which we can attribute (as his free decision) what, in our phenomenal self-awareness, we experience as part of our inherited or otherwise imposed nature.The conclusion to be drawn is thus, again, that Self-Consciousness itself is radically unconscious.